One View of Compulsory Licensing: Comparative Perspectives From India and Canada by Ramanujam, Padmanabha & Goyal, Yugank
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 5
One View of Compulsory Licensing: Comparative
Perspectives From India and Canada
Padmanabha Ramanujam
Yugank Goyal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Padmanabha Ramanujam and Yugank Goyal, One View of Compulsory Licensing: Comparative Perspectives From India and Canada, 18
Marq. Intellectual Property L. Rev. 369 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol18/iss2/5
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014 1:41 PM 
 
 
 
ONE VIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSING: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES FROM INDIA 
AND CANADA 
PADMANABHA RAMANUJAM AND YUGANK GOYAL* 
I.  BY WAY OF A PROLOGUE ................................................................. 375 
II.  COMPULSORY LICENSING: CONCEPT AND SHORT HISTORY ........... 377 
III.  PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES AND THEIR COEXISTENCE IN 
IPR: ONE VIEW OF THE MODEL ................................................. 381 
A.  Transaction Costs as Determinant of Choice of Legal Rule 381 
B.  Licensing .............................................................................. 384 
C.  Licensing and IPR Strength .................................................. 386 
D.  Connecting the Dots ............................................................. 391 
IV.  IPR REGIMES OF CANADA AND INDIA ........................................... 391 
A.  Access to Medicine Regime in Canada ................................ 393 
B.  Pharmaceutical Patents in India ........................................... 394 
V.  LOCATING CANADA AND INDIA IN THE MODEL .............................. 396 
A.  Compulsory Licensing and its Impact on Strength of IP 
Regime ................................................................................ 397 
B.  Procedural Problems with Compulsory Licensing in Canada 
and India ............................................................................. 400 
C.  Voluntary Licensing Works Alone but Cannot Co-Exist with 
Compulsory Licensing ........................................................ 402 
VI.  BY WAY OF AN EPILOGUE ............................................................. 405 
 
  
 
* Padmanabha Ramanujam is Associate Professor and Associate Dean at Jindal Global Law 
School. Yugank Goyal is Honorary Research Fellow at Jindal Global Law School and Erasmus 
Mundus Doctoral candidate at Bologna, Rotterdham and Hamburg. An earlier version of this paper 
was presented at Conference on “Global North and Global South Perspectives on Transnational 
Governance: An Indo-Canadian Perspectives,” held at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto, in October 2010. Authors would like to thank participants in the conference whose comments 
were greatly valuable. In particular, suggestions from Giuseppina D’Agostino, Abhayraj Naik, Dipika 
Jain and D.K. Srivastava were insightful. Separately, authors are thankful to Reto Hilty, Matthias 
Lamping, Jerome Reichman, Ajay Kumar Pandey Peter Drahos, N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Geertrui van 
Overwalle and Henning Groβe Ruse-Khan for their inputs. Excellent research assistance of Titiksha 
Mohanty, Ramya Hari, Gaurav Sharma and Kushagra Verma is appreciated. All errors and omissions 
remain authors’ alone.  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
370 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:2 
 
  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
2014] ONE VIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 371 
 
PADMANABHA RAMANUJAM 
 
Padmanabha Ramanujam is an Associate Professor and Associate Dean at 
Jindal Global Law School part of O.P. Jindal Global University. He specializes 
in Intellectual property, with a particular focus on economic analysis of 
intellectual property rights (domestically and abroad). He also specializes in 
Competition Law, Law of Contract and law and Economics. He is a Ph.D. 
candidate under the Asia Link Fellowship Programme sponsored by the 
European Union at Hamburg University Institute of Law and Economics, 
Germany and the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. He also 
holds a Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree in Intellectual Property Rights from the 
University of East Anglia (UEA), UK with a distinction, where he was also 
awarded the University of East Anglia International Scholarship, Norwich Law 
School Scholarship and the University of East Anglia Best International 
Applicant Award. His other qualifications include a Master of Business Laws 
(M.B.L.) from the National Law School of India University, Bangalore and 
Bachelor of Law (B.A.L., LL.B.) from University Law College, Bangalore 
University.  
He has also published several empirical and theoretical papers on issues 
relating to intellectual property rights, open source, culture studies and 
innovation. In a recent book published by Oxford University Press (December 
2009) he has co-authored, “Indian Patent Regime for the Pharmaceutical 
Sector: Law and Economics Analysis of the Novartis Case”. This paper has 
received great attention of many legal scholars who work in the field of 
intellectual property rights. 
  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
372 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:2 
 
  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
2014] ONE VIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 373 
 
YUGANK GOYAL 
 
Yugank Goyal is Erasmus Mundus PhD Candidate at University of 
Hamburg (home institution), Erasmus University Rotterdam and University of 
Bologna. He is Honorary Research Fellow at Jindal Global Law School, where 
he was the Assistant Professor from 2009 until 2012. He taught Economics of 
Intellectual Property Law, Economic Analysis of Law, Global Financial 
Markets, Microeconomics, Economic Analysis of Tort Law and Institutional 
Theory. He enjoys interdisciplinary studies and has special interest in 
intellectual property rights, law and economics, new institutional economics, 
informal markets, economic history and regulation.  Previously, he has worked 
as a Consultant on development projects with an Indian private bank's joint 
venture with an Indian state government’s agency. He obtained his Bachelor of 
Technology in Mechanical Engineering from NIT, Surat, India, and 
thereafter, LL.M. in Law & Economics as Erasmus Mundus Scholar from 
Rotterdam, Hamburg and Manchester.  
  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
374 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:2 
 
  
RAMANUJAM GOYAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
2014] ONE VIEW OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 375 
 
I.  BY WAY OF A PROLOGUE 
Lockean property rights theory1 establishes that a creation belongs naturally 
to its creator.  There is little disagreement that property and property rights are 
born simultaneously.  Information is an intangible property and is produced 
through the labour of intellect.  Again, invoking Locke,2 this information should 
then be private property of the labourer.3  But information is a non-excludable 
and non-rival good.4  Hence, a (legal) framework to grant (a) exclusive right for 
(b) a limited period helps sequentially5 balance (a) incentive (for labourer) to 
produce the information, and (b) access (for society) to make use of the 
information. This framework is intellectual property. 
So as to favour accessibility of intellectual property thus created, society 
needs a transaction system whereby the benefits of creation (legally said, 
property right) can be shared amongst all those who value it.  This system is 
naturally based on some sort of market transactions.  The buyer of the right 
pays some money for it.  The seller of the right takes that money as 
compensation for having made a socially beneficial creation.  Where demand 
meets the supply, price is determined.  We achieve an equilibrium. 
However, this may be a difficult equilibrium to achieve because of the 
inherent non-rival and non-excludable nature of the information good6–once 
the intellectual property has been divulged to another person it becomes a 
public good.7  Such characteristics allow free-riders to take access without 
 
1. JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 
19–21 (Charles L. Sherman ed. 1937) (1690). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Inventions, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 609 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1962) (for illustration of this problem). 
5. The sequence is as follows: initially, with exclusive rights, the information becomes 
excludable. Thereafter, when work passes into public domain, it becomes free for the consumers. 
6. Information good/service is any commodity/service whose value is determined by the 
information it contains. The nature of material does not matter, but only arrangement of material 
matters. Common examples are CD, computer file, book, invention formula, and so on. See JAMES 
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(1996). 
7. A public good in economics is considered to be non-rival, meaning goods/services where 
increasing consumption of that good/service does not reduces its availability to other users; and also 
non-excludable, which are those goods where it may be impossible to prevent people who have not 
paid for that good/service. Imagine national defense, or air in the environment. These are public goods. 
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 308, 308 (Inge 
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999) (for theoretical treatment of knowledge as public 
good); FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE & YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 7–9 
(2004) (for an excellent understanding of non-rivalry and non-excludability in intellectual property 
rights).  
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paying.8  Therefore, society needs an artificial mechanism that excludes non-
payers, lest the market generates insufficient revenues to compensate the 
creator for his efforts and dilute his incentives to create that property in the first 
place.  This artificial mechanism is provided by an exclusionary right, called 
IPR.  So while IPR accords temporary monopoly power on the right holder, it 
results in a deadweight loss in the form of excluding buyers for who the good 
has become unaffordable.9  The upside is, IPR framework incentivizes people 
to innovate and it also propels diffusion on knowledge, thereby helping 
development of cumulative innovations.  Designing an optimal IPR framework 
therefore demands a compromise between the costs and benefits at both public 
and private realms. 
As the normative and structural strands of legal theory suggest, IP laws are 
fundamentally located in the skeleton of property rule.  However, given the 
public good nature of the information product, temporary monopoly imposes 
huge public costs.  Take for example, pharmaceutical innovation.  A life-saving 
drug, when granted a patent, will be sold at a cost unaffordable to a large chunk 
of population thereby increasing social costs.  For such externality that 
germinates in intellectual property laws, incorporation of liability rules has 
emerged as a reactionary solution.  In this paper, we will attempt to show that 
proponents of liability rules carry a heavy theoretical burden that needs to be 
spelt out.10 
The paper is an attempt to excavate silences of property-liability framework 
in a cacophony of compulsory licensing.  The remainder of the paper is divided 
as follows.  In Part I, we illustrate the legal framework of compulsory licensing 
as a mechanism by way of which the right holder of the intellectual property 
(IP) will have to license the use of her/his rights to another party, at the behest 
of the government.  Part II explores the relationship between compulsory 
licensing and property-liability framework.  We highlight here, that compulsory 
licensing is a liability-based approach, and its imposition on a foundational 
 
8. See Arrow, supra note 4; TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOPS BOYS: A LIFE OF WILBUR AND 
ORVILLE WRIGHT (for a classic example. In this biography, the author described the Wright brothers’ 
dilemma when, prior to filing for a patent on their airplane design, they were approached by the 
government to reveal their invention; they proposed a large up-front payment to solve the problem); 
see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to Law and Economics 
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 3 (1991). 
9. A deadweight loss is reduction in transactions by throwing out those buyers who now find it 
unaffordable to pay. Landes & Posner, supra note 8. 
10. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent 
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate 27 RES. POL’Y 273 (1998) (the paper shows that the 
conventional astuteness amongst economists, lawyers, and many public officials is heavily weighted 
towards the proposition that “patent rights are conducive to economic progress”). 
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property rights based approach on which IP laws are based, needs to attract 
academic principles that guide this approach.  We expect to surface the 
institutional, conceptual, and theoretical feasibility inherent in the marriage of 
property and liability based approach for compulsory licensing, through 
building an analytical narrative.  In Part III, IPR regimes of India and Canada 
are compared with a focus on patents for medicines.  In the case of Canada, we 
look at the institution of compulsory licensing from the view of the Doha 
Declaration,11 by way of which relevant clauses that favour implementation of 
compulsory licensing provisions were incorporated into the text of Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).12  The case of India is however, 
hinged on the regular flexibility in TRIPS, as incorporated in the Indian Patents 
Act 2005.  Conclusion follows in Part IV. 
II.  COMPULSORY LICENSING: CONCEPT AND SHORT HISTORY 
The term “compulsory license” is often used as an umbrella term for many 
types of non-voluntary authorizations by the State (or any of the State’s 
machinery) to exercise a patentee’s rights without his or her authorisation, such 
as ex officio licenses, government use, crown (or government) use, licenses to 
remedy anti-competitive practices, mandatory licenses, and statutory licenses.13  
Compulsory licenses can be given for any kind of intellectual property, and it 
can take various names.  In general, compulsory licensing is used to address 
anti-competitive issues of IPR.14  The extensive survey taken by World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) between 2009-11 exposed a wide 
variety of usages of the term compulsory licensing,15 which included invoking 
on account of national or public interest; public health; compulsory cross-
 
11. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (The basic idea was to carve out flexibilities in TRIPS 
particularly for circumventing patent rights for ensuring that access to essential medicines is not 
adversely affected in (mainly) developing regions of the world. Paragraphs 6 of Doha Declaration 
states: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this 
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.” This paragraph was implemented 
in amending the TRIPS Agreement by the Ministerial Declaration taken on 30 August 2003). 
12. Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder art. 31, Jun. 1, 1995, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 300, 313 (Article 
31 of TRIPS is a result of Doha Declaration) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
13. Coenraad Visser, Patent Exceptions and Limitations in the Health Context, at 10, U.N. Doc. 
SCP/15/3 (Sep. 2, 2010). 
14. WIPO Secretariat, Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to 
Address Anti-Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights, U.N. Doc. CDIP/4/4 
REV./STUDY/INF/5 [hereinafter Survey on Compulsory Licenses]. 
15. Id. 
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licensing; failure to work; non-exploitation of IP rights for a period of time; 
patent-dependency; necessity to supply markets; exporting patented drugs; 
inter alia.16  The concept can also take various nomenclatures.  For example, in 
the European Union (and also in the United States), in the case of a single 
dominant company, the concept is called the ‘essential facilities doctrine.’  An 
essential facilities doctrine specifies when the owner(s) of an essential or 
bottleneck facility is mandated to provide access to that facility at a reasonable 
price.17  The term essential facilities doctrine originated in commentary on 
United States antitrust case law and now has multiple meanings, each having 
to do with mandating access to something by those who do not otherwise get 
access.18  Over time however, the doctrine is more closely associated with anti 
trust cases, and its application in IP is rather rare.19  Compulsory licensing is 
fairly important and frequent however, in copyright statutes.  For example, the 
Copyright Act of 1909 and 1976 in USA, both have compulsory licensing 
provisions.20 
But in no other domain has compulsory licensing been more debated, 
contextualized and argued over, as in the case of pharmaceutical patents.  
Health improvements stimulate economic development21 and so does 
innovation.  If there is a trade-off between the two, it is a difficult choice.  
Compulsory licensing seems to tip the needle in favour of health, and therefore, 
has been the source of unending controversies, socio-political maneuvering by 
interest groups, and schism between industry and civil society.  On one hand, 
industry supporters argue that doling out compulsory licenses reduces 
incentives to innovate, while on the other, civil society and public health 
advocates vociferously narrate the perils associated with giving monopoly 
rights on life saving drugs.  Our paper deals with the subject of compulsory 
licensing, solely on the application of compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical 
patents. 
It may be worthwhile to have a quick glance at how the global political 
machinery developed the framework of compulsory licensing.22  Compulsory 
 
16. Id. at 7–8. 
17. OECD, Policy Roundtables The Essential Facilities Concept (1996), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd\34/20/1920021.pdf. 
18. Id. at 7. 
19. Survey on Compulsory Licenses, supra note 16. 
20. See Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 
5 W. NEW ENG. L. R. 203, 204 (1982). 
21. David E. Bloom & David Canning, The Health and Wealth of Nations, 287 SCIENCE 1207, 
1209 (2000). 
22. See JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF 
PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA ISSUE PAPER NO. 5 13 (2003) at 
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Licensing has been an integral part of the patent regime since its inception and 
at least one hundred countries make compulsory licenses available in one form 
or another.23  The introduction of patents in Venice in the fifteenth century was 
accompanied by a broad set of rules, which included the state’s right to issue a 
compulsory license.24  Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention of 1883 also 
provides for the liability rule.25  And ever since 1883, this tool has become a 
fixture in patent systems around the world, and has perpetually been a topic of 
controversy.26  Even during the World Wars, compulsory licensing was resorted 
to for the sharing of aviation technology and the manufacture of penicillin.27 
It may be important to briefly dwell on emergence of compulsory licensing 
in the international framework as it stands today.  With the decline of American 
manufacturing and growth of technology-led firms, the United States began 
raising the public perception of the importance of IPR.28  The result was the 
linking of IP with trade and seeking global protection.29  This attracted a lot of 
resistance, particularly by developing countries like India.30  However, with the 
intense political maneuvering and bargaining power that America had over 
trade with India and other countries, coupled with pressure groups of 
pharmaceutical companies, developing nations succumbed.  A comprehensive 
agreement was tabled and negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the 
 
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf. 
23. Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: 
Options for Developing Countries, 4, 24 (Ctr. for Advanced Studies at the Univ. of Buenos Aires, Arg., 
Working Paper 1999).  
24. CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL 
HISTORY 58–59 (2006). 
25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, England–France–
Sweden–United States, art. 5, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_
wo020.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”) 
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
26. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing 
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 859 (2003). 
27. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY & PROMOTION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON 
COMPULSORY LICENSING (2011) available at http://thebigredbiotechblog.typepad.com/files/dipp-cl-
draftdiscussion1.doc. 
28. Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory–TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 
32 CASE W. RES. J.  INT’L L. 357, 367 (2000). 
29. It is well illustrated how senior management of Pfizer was responsible for creating this link, 
by bringing together various other interested corporations and making IP privileges the most important 
priority of the United States in the 1980s. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL 
BUSINESS REGULATION 61–62 (2000). 
30. Elizabeth Chien-Hale, Asserting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Expansion of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 44 J. COPR. SOC’Y 198, 226; see also ROBERT C. BIRD, Defending 
Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 328–29 (2006). 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994, called Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights31 (TRIPS).  Essentially, 
countries embracing TRIPS were required to fulfill greater IP protection, with 
the patent period fixed at twenty years, and in return got access to foreign 
markets and a safety net from whims of unilateral sanctions from their 
governments.32  TRIPS was a revolution in the world of intellectual property 
with pharmaceutical companies emerging as major winners.33  To be a member 
of WTO, countries had to sign TRIPS (although their signing was deferred until 
later, by when they were thought to develop sufficient expertise to be able to 
withstand competitive forces from the industrialized world).34 
What the developing countries achieved through the TRIPS negotiations 
was the tool of compulsory licensing expressed in Article 31.35  In short, 
referring to “use without the authorization of the right holder,” article 31 
explicitly permits member states to issue compulsory licenses under three 
circumstances: (1) after efforts to obtain a license from the patent holder on 
“reasonable commercial terms and conditions” have failed, (2) in the case of 
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” and (3) for 
public non-commercial use.  Although the usage of this tool came with certain 
preconditions, they were waived off in cases of national emergency.36  One of 
the conditions however, was to employ the use of compulsory licensing 
predominantly for domestic markets,37 and many of the concerned markets had 
no ability or capacity to manufacture the generic version of the patented drug 
in question.  This constraint was removed through the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, now known as Doha Round, where developing nations firmly 
resolved to participate only if their demands were met. Finally, Ministerial 
 
31. See Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, supra note 12 at 311–15; Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
32. See Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, supra note 12 at art. 418. 
33. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: 
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 247 (2009). 
34. Countries like India, China, Brazil were given time until 2005, while other countries, 
particularly the LDCs were offered a delay of few more years (patents until 2013 and pharmaceutical 
patents until 2016). See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension 
of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 
2005); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition 
Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain 
Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002). 
35. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, supra 
note 12; JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 24 (2002) (Noting that Indian delegation was instrumental in getting the article 
incorporated). 
36. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 12. 
37. Id.  
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 affirmed that 
TRIPS can be interpreted to promote access to medicines for all38 and later 
expressly declared the legitimacy for importing the drug from countries that are 
willing to do so.39  This waiver is also called the Decision of 30 August 2003.40 
III.  PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES AND THEIR COEXISTENCE IN IPR: 
ONE VIEW OF THE MODEL 
In the four sub-sections that follow, we propose to argue that countries 
having weak property rights framework will (and should) attract liability 
regimes and those that are characterized by strong property rights framework 
do not need to invoke liability structures.  In other words, compulsory licensing 
is justified if IP regimes of countries are weak and not when they are strong.  
The sections methodically show how: (a) choice of property or liability rests on 
transaction costs, (b) licensing mode (compulsory or voluntary) depends on 
transaction costs, (c) low transaction costs favour strong IPR regimes and high 
costs prefer weak IPR frameworks.  In the last sub-section we link these 
findings to show that compulsory licensing regimes will be successful in weak 
IPR regimes. 
A.  Transaction Costs as Determinant of Choice of Legal Rule 
The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules was set in the most 
illustrative manner in Calabresi-Melamed’s seminal paper (hereinafter referred 
to as Cathedral Paper) published in 1972.41  This was an interesting and 
convincing analytical tool stimulating scholars in various disciplines–most 
notably in law and economics–to cross-navigate beyond established 
terminology to appreciate functional and formal differences/congruence 
between two different areas of law–property and liability.42  The property-
 
38. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
¶4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001). 
39. Id. at ¶6. 
40. This waiver however, has only been used once by Canada in exporting the drug to Rwanda, 
owing to procedural inefficiencies. See Paige E. Goodwin, Right Idea, Wrong Result–Canada’s Access 
to Medicines Regime, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567 (2008); note that the following countries agreed not to 
use the Paragraph 6 provisions as importing members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of 
America. Id. 
41. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of a Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
42. It was because of this article, along with his other seminal work in tort law that he is 
considered to be a founder of law and economics movement, along with Ronald Coase and Richard 
Posner. Under his influence (he was the Dean of Yale Law School) Yale Law School became one of 
the leading centre for economics influenced legal scholarship.  
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liability rule framework has inspired a range of scholarship in issues related to 
legal protection of information goods43, and has been extremely useful in 
understanding copyright collectives44, determining appropriate protection of 
incentives to innovate45 and explaining relationship between several IP 
regimes.46 
Cathedral Paper puts forth what are property rules and how do they differ 
from liability regime: 
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone 
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from 
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is 
agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of entitlement which gives rise 
to the least amount of state intervention: once the original entitlement 
is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value. It lets each of 
the parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the 
seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough. . . . Whenever someone 
may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively 
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule. . . . 
Obviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state 
intervention: not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or 
destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by some organ 
of the state rather than by the parties themselves.47 
Hence, a property rule is a legal entitlement that can be bought only after 
bargaining with the entitlement holder and the price for the transaction is 
mutually decided by the buyer (holder) and seller of the right.  On the other 
hand, under a liability rule, a tribunal (third party) will determine the 
appropriate compensation in an ex post proceeding.  Cathedral Paper’s 
argument establishes that transaction cost48 is the primary determinant of the 
 
43. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damage Rules in 
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1693 (demonstrating how Cathedral Paper 
should be decided for baseline recovery in cases of IP infringement–plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s 
profits accrued from infringement); see also Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000) (for a critical argument utilizing Cathedral paper in favour of injunctive 
relief in internet context); Alex Kozinsky & Christopher Newman, What’s so Fair about Fair Use?, 
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513 (1999) (in the context of copyright law). 
44. Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organization, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 
45. Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting 
Intellectual Property, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 199, 202 (2001). 
46. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2558 (1994). 
47. Calabresi, supra note 41 at 1092 (footnote omitted) 
48. Simply put, transaction costs in terms of law and economics are those costs that are incurred 
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choice for property rule or liability rule. Whenever market transaction costs are 
low, property rules are preferred; while liability rules are favoured when the 
transaction costs are high.49  The argument for such factorization is simple.  
Whether parties can negotiate for the transaction of the right is a direct function 
of how costly the bargaining process is.  In other words, transaction costs will 
determine whether price discovery will be a result of negotiation or whether a 
third party will impose prices it has determined on the basis of (so-called) 
objective criteria.  The doctrine asserts that low transaction costs favour 
negotiation and reaching a Coasian bargain,50 while high transaction costs will 
impede any Coasian solution to be achieved.51  Therefore in the case of high 
transaction costs, parties will not be able to come to a mutually agreeable 
solution, and will need a tribunal (third party) which can declare the damage 
quantum and ensure the same.  This is a crucial starting point for hinging our 
discussion against. 
Low market transaction costs facilitate negotiation and adjustments, so 
there is no need of a third party to enforce a bargain.  The parties themselves 
can contract mutually.  However, when institutional design of voluntary 
negotiation is ineffective due to high transaction costs, liability rule (third party 
enforcement) suits best.  Remember that employing property rule is possible 
only when transaction costs are low.  This in turn means that (a) parties to a 
transaction are easily identifiable to each other, (b) costs of transaction between 
the parties is low, “and ([c]) a court setting the terms of the exchange would 
have a difficult time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature 
of the assets and the varied and complex business environments in which the 
assets are deployed.”52  Hence parties make their own deal.  This approach 
generally builds the argument that property rules are better suited to protect IP 
as opposed to liability rules in case of low transaction cost.  Liability rules 
always come with an efficiency loss and their application in presence of low 
 
in making an economic exchange. These may include search and information costs, bargaining costs, 
enforcement costs, contracting costs, negotiation costs. Transaction cost economics has led to a series 
of development in law and economics scholarship. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (for first theoretical reference); see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics 
of Organisation: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548 (1981).  
49. Calabresi, supra note 41. 
50. Coase in his seminal article suggested that if initial entitlements are clear, they don’t matter 
in absence of transaction costs. Efficient solution will always be reached no matter who has the 
entitlement. This is famously called Coase Theorem. He proposed that if transaction costs are 
negligible, parties can effectively negotiate and contract to buy the right. Whoever values it more will 
get it, and that in fact is efficient solution. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]. 
51. Calabresi, supra note 41 at 1106-8.  
52. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994). 
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transaction costs does not make sense since the objective can be achieved at a 
lesser cost.  One can imagine such efficiency losses in costs imposed by 
incomplete information of the third party, inefficient fixation of price, 
diminished utility of the parties, procedural delays and constraints, 
administrative expenses, flaws in institutional design, generation of perverse 
incentives, possibilities of errors, political economy factors, psychological 
costs or perhaps, the transaction not taking place at all (which happens to be the 
case many a times).  On the other hand, in presence of high transaction costs, 
liability rules are employed to avoid the danger of adopting a suboptimal 
solution, a result that flows naturally if we modify the Coase theorem and view 
it from a non-zero transaction cost perspective.53  The costs of incorporating 
liability rule in a property rule set-up is offset by the exercise of the transaction 
which should yield a higher optimal outcome. 
The Cathedral Paper therefore states, among other things, that the choice of 
property or liability rule depends on transaction costs.  Property rules are 
achieved in low transaction costs, while liability rules are used when transaction 
costs are high.  This can further be explained to understand that property rule 
is applied when negotiation is possible because transactions costs are lower, 
whereas liability rule is applied when negotiation is not possible in the face of 
high transaction costs. 
B.  Licensing 
Licensing activity refers to the grant of creator’s rights (IP right) to non-
creator at a price called licensing fee.  Low market transaction cost facilitates 
negotiated licensing transaction between the right holder and the one who is 
seeking the license for using and sharing the right holder’s invention (if it is a 
patent, say).  When market transaction costs are low, it lets the parties negotiate 
and reach a mutually amicable price for the license.  On the other hand, if the 
market is faced with a high transaction cost, it is difficult to bargain the license.  
Therefore, in those circumstances, government/a court acts as a third party and 
intervenes through ‘non-voluntary’ contract between the creator and the non-
creator.  The crucial assumption–which we are not disputing–is that for public 
interest, it is indeed important that the license be given.  In the absence of a 
third party, and in presence of high transaction costs, the license will never be 
doled out, which is not the desirable solution.  The solution comes in the form 
of an involuntary contract enforced by a third party.  This intervention comes 
in the form of compulsory licensing (for the purpose of this article, in patents).  
The government authorizes itself to allow third parties to use the subject matter 
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder or a mandated 
 
53. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 50. 
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authorization of the right holder.  In these cases, the public interest in broader 
access to the invention is considered more important than the private interest of 
the right holder to fully exploit his exclusive rights.54 
Compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical products aims at ensuring that 
everyone has an access to essential medicines at affordable prices.  While 
recognizing a nation’s right to protect the public health of its people, even at 
the expense of not honoring intellectual property rights, TRIPS was flexibilized 
through incorporation of clauses concerning compulsory licensing, and nations 
securing their desire to amend their national laws to conform to the flexible 
TRIPS in the manner it suits best to the nations.  In addition, the Inter-
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization initiated the Doha 
Agenda.  The objective of granting compulsory licenses is to prevent the abuse 
of monopoly granted by the patent, and to safeguard the public welfare and 
health care issues prevailing in the nations.  In the present context, the exercise 
is sought to obtain permission to manufacture the generic versions of the 
patented drug.  Compulsory license is generally made “available for 
manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country 
having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
for the concerned product to address public health problems.”55 
It is notable that the very logic behind providing the flexibility is to fulfill 
the normative frameworks of public health, at the cost of rights-based 
framework.  Compulsory licensing therefore portrays liability framework 
because the rights holders are protected by a “liability rule” (royalty set by the 
government) instead of a “property rule” (receipt of an injunction with the 
rights-holder then negotiating the price out with potential buyers).56  Hence, 
while compulsory licensing stands as a true liability rule, property rule is 
invoked whenever licenses are given on voluntary licensing.  Whether property 
rule (voluntary licensing) or liability rule (involuntary licensing) should be 
preferred is a discussion we will come back to a little later.  With little reason, 
it stands clear that voluntary licensing will take place if the transaction costs 
are low, while compulsory licensing will be preferred in high transaction costs 
(negotiation for licensing without involving a third party is easy if bargaining 
costs are low, while for higher bargaining costs, negotiations will fail or not 
take place at all–a clear case for third party intervention). 
The above discussion demonstrates that voluntary licensing is possible at 
 
54. REICHMANN & HASENZAHL, supra note 22. 
55. Swarup Kumar, Compulsory Licensing under Trips: A Study of Roche v. Natco Case in 
India vis-à-vis the Applicability of the Principle of Audi Alteram Partem, 7 SCRIPTED 135, 149 (2010) 
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-1/kumar.asp. 
56. Calabresi, supra note 41. 
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low transaction costs, whereas high transaction costs disfavour voluntary 
licensing.  This also means that compulsory licensing emerges in the 
foreground when transaction costs in the picture are higher. 
C.  Licensing and IPR Strength 
Trade in licensing is a natural consequence.  A license is a commercial 
contract between licensor and licensee.  Primarily, it specifies two basic 
features–the subject material which has an intellectual property and functional 
use of the subject material.  The licensee compensates the licensor for use of 
licensed subject by a flat fee (lump-sum) and/or through royalties based on 
income earned by the licensee.  The royalty rate can be fixed at a varying 
percentage of licensee’s value of output, units of output, profits, or sales.57  
Licensees save the expense of independent research and development for the 
licensee and licensors derive fees and royalties, as well as capitalize on 
licensees’ local reputation and knowledge.  There are a number of other 
advantages of licensing for both the parties, thereby achieving Pareto optimal58 
solutions: 
a) Some companies may not have sufficient investment capacity to 
operationalise Foreign Direct Investment and penetrate the market 
on their own.  These small companies therefore can then use licenses 
to test a market before making huge investments. 
b) Licensing creates an easy entry and exit from the pharmaceutical 
market, which is otherwise characterized by high fixed costs and 
therefore rigid and few exit options.59 
c) Licensors can earn fixed revenue much quicker from the license and 
therefore get an early return on their research and development 
(R&D) efforts.60 
Our contention is that when costs of enforcing contracts (transaction costs) 
 
57. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES: A SURVEY FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT (1995); see also Bharat N. Anand and Tarun 
Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 130 (2000). 
58. Pareto Optimality is due to Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist whose thesis had that 
optimality is achieved when there is at least one person better off with no one worse off. See VILFREDO 
PARETO, COURS D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (vol. II 1897); JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS 
AND THE LAW 67–132 (1988) (for discussion about Pareto efficiency in detail). 
59. Author believes that FDI may be very costly exercise. Also export sales may face tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. 
60. This is an important point. It was raised at the High-Level Workshop on IPR and Economic 
Development in China: Meeting Challenges and Opportunities Following WTO Entry, Beijing, April 
2004, organised by OECD in collaboration with State IP Office and Development Research Centre of 
State Council, China. 
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are low, this may be because of strong IPR regimes.  Strong IPR regimes can 
be characterized by clearly defined rights and identifiable boundaries, rights 
holder-favouring regime, emphasis on innovation and incentives structure, 
strong enforcement mechanisms, and certainty.  And interestingly, certainty 
reduces market transaction costs.  The certainty of entitlement of the right 
reduces costs associated with identification, information, and bargaining.  In 
addition, certainty also crystallizes the boundaries of patents.  It creates strong 
enforcement mechanisms, thereby making infringement impossible and 
licensing the only alternative for access to technology.  Thus stronger IPRs will 
facilitate expanded licensing regimes and may confer excess market power 
thereby lifting up license fee and discouraging prospective licensees.  However, 
if the license fee is worth the investment, it will result in license being issued, 
and if it is not, then compelled by market forces (under our assumption of low 
market transaction costs), the license fee will reduce.  Either ways, an efficient 
solution will be achieved.  On the other hand, if the IPR regime is weak, the 
right holder may still want to license his right to a local producer to have the 
latter safeguard him against possible infringement. 
There have been several studies taking different approaches that have 
gotten more or less similar results.  In 1984, Farok Contractor attempted to 
correlate patent protection and licensing using cross-sectional data, which 
explained the determinants of the ratio of receipts in the United States of 
royalties and licensing fees from unaffiliated sources to various measures of 
direct investment activity.61  The study defined patent intensity of a nation by 
flows of new patents in force.  Technology transfer on the other hand was used 
as proxy for licensing.  The study found that patent intensity indeed did attract 
licensing.  The argument behind this observation is that patent protection 
increases the income extractable from licensing.  In another well-cited study, 
Edwin Mansfield established62 that multinationals are less likely to engage in 
technology transfer (licensing) with firms of countries where IP protection is 
weak.63  In yet another study, Pamela Smith infers64 that the effect of stronger 
IPRs on international licensing depends on the imitative capabilities of host 
countries, by drawing on cross-sectional data on US multinationals’ licensing 
 
61. Farok J. Contractor, Choosing Between Direct Investment and Licensing: Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Tests, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 167 (1984). 
62. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and 
Technology Transfer, INT’L FIN. CORP. Discussion Paper No. 19, (1994). 
63. However, this finding depends on the industry or nature of the technology. U.S. firms in the 
chemicals and electronics industries appeared to place a greater emphasis on intellectual property 
protection, whereas firms in the metals and transportation industries were seen to be less reliant on it. 
See id. 
64. Pamela Smith, How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales, and 
Licenses?, 48 J. INT’L ECON. 151 (2001). 
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activities in 50 countries.65 
Later studies extended the scope and methodology of the general finding, 
that strong patent rights and licensing activities are positively correlated.  Yang 
and Maskus extended the analysis of US foreign licensing to a panel data set 
covering three time periods (1985, 1990, and 1995) and twenty-three partner 
countries, of which approximately ten are developing or emerging market 
economies.  They found that countries with stronger patent rights attract larger 
volumes of licensed technology.66  More recently, Michael Nicholson finds that 
R&D intensive firms are more apt to license when patent protection is strong.67  
His approach is to focus on count data rather than value data.  It was a cross-
sectional empirical analysis and it pools together data for 1995 from forty-nine 
destination countries and eighty-two industries. 
While previous studies were using Bureau of Economic Analysis 
aggregated industry or national level data, Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley 
conducted a study using Bureau of Economic Analysis micro-data. A key 
finding was that IPR reforms–signifying strength of patent protection–stimulate 
US firms to license abroad to affiliated parties.68 
Anand and Khanna attempted to explore how much licensing is dependent 
on IPR protection levels.  The study employed data on international licensing 
contracts from the Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances database of the 
Securities Data Company.69  The authors found that licensing in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical sectors is dependent on patent protection, while 
licensing in the semiconductor industry is relatively less dependent on it.  In 
their hypothesis, the authors suggested that this could be due to the fact that 
contents and boundaries of knowledge are relatively easy to ascertain for 
products in pharmaceutical and chemical industry, but for products in semi-
conductors (circuit-layout etc.), knowledge boundaries are blurred so patent 
protection cannot be substantial enough to encourage licensing. 
Another study, one that has empirically arrived at conflicting result, is that 
of Andrea Fosfuri in 2003.70  It established weak effects of IPRs on 
 
65. In situations where imitative risk is low, stronger IPRs serve primarily to raise rents to rights 
holders. In countries where imitative capabilities are high, stronger patent rights stimulate licensing to 
unaffiliated foreign firms. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 8. 
66. Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An 
Econometric Investigation, 137 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 58 (2001). 
67. Michael Nicholson (2003) “The Impact of Industry Characteristics on International 
Technology Transfer”, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission Working Paper. 
68. Lee G. Branstetter, Raymond Fisman & C. Fritz Foley, Do Stronger Intellectual Property 
Rights Increase International Technology Transfer?, (Columbia Business School Working Paper No. 
20, 2002). 
69. Anand & Khanna, supra note 57, at 105. 
70. Andrea Fosfuri, Country Risk and the International Flows of Technology: Evidence from 
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international licensing and found that patent rights have an insignificant or 
negative effect on licensing.  It used firm-level data for the world chemical 
industry.  However, this study was focusing only on firms with process 
innovations. And for such innovations, patents may not be the most effective 
mechanism.  In fact, it has been noted that biotechnology–a standard process 
innovation–firms prefer trade secrecy to patent protection.71  Process 
innovations are harder to enforce compared to product innovations.  In other 
words, as explained in the next section, process patents are equivalent to weak 
IP protection, and a move from process to product patents is a move towards 
stronger IP protection. Hence, this finding does not in any way undermine the 
results found in other papers. 
One study, conducted by OECD, deserves our special attention because of 
its elaborate methodology and effective control variables.72  This study 
undertakes a regression analysis to estimate the relationship between indicators 
for licensing and IPR strength in developing countries, while controlling for 
other factors.  This study attempts to make an empirical contribution to one of 
the main channels of technology transfer–licensing.  It considered the 
relationship between strengthening of IPR and licensing activities, particularly 
in the 1990s.  It employed a regression analysis to draw on an international data 
set to consider the relationship over time between changes in the host-country 
patent regime and changes in the number of licensing transactions between 
developed and developing countries.  The strength of IPR was measured by 
different IP index, like patent rights,73 copyrights74 and trademarks,75 and 
finally the fourth index examines enforcement effectiveness.76 
This study is conducted first using aggregate data, then the firm-level data.  
 
the Chemical Industry (July 2003) (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper). 
71. Nikolaus Thumm, Research and Patenting in Biotechnology: A Survey in Switzerland, 
SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/
Juristische_Infos/e/j10005e.pdf  1 (2003), https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Juristische_
Infos/e/j10005e.pdf. 
72. Walter G. Park & Douglas Lippoldt, The Impact of Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights on trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, 3 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV. PAPERS (SPECIAL ISSUE ON TRADE POLICY) Paper No. 294 (2003). 
73. Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross National Study, 
26 RES. POL’Y 283; Walter G. Park & Smita Wagh, Index of Patent Rights, in ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
OF THE WORLD ANNUAL REPORT 2002 (James Gwartney et al. eds., 2002). 
74. Taylor William Reynolds, Quantifying the Evolution of Copyright and Trademark Law 
(2004) (Doctoral dissertation paper). 
75. Id. 
76. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Reports_Publications/Section_Index.html (last visited 20 Oct. 2010) (No formal study has 
been done to measure enforcement effectiveness, but some information collected by Park and Lippoldt 
comes from reports filed with US Trade Representatives.) 
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Variables that needed controlling were, gross productivity, corruption, tariff 
rates, and country risks for example. The study finds general support for the 
proposition that strengthening of IPRs has a net positive effect on technology 
transfer via licensing.  This result is perhaps synchronous with our first 
prediction that strong IPRs (effective enforcement and certainty in bargaining) 
make it attractive for right holders to appropriate the returns to innovation by 
increasing the licensing efforts.  It is interesting to note that licensing fees and 
royalties were found to vary positively with stronger patent rights and more 
effective enforcement.77  A country can stimulate innovation more effectively 
only with a given strengthening of patent rights.  This is because patents 
generate deadweight loss in the country that affords protection and accordingly 
provides for dynamic efficiency.  Scholars have constructed an index of patent 
rights and have shown that the index is highly correlated with per capita GDP, 
accordingly Global North (producers of innovation) typically provide stronger 
patent protection than their counterparts in the Global South (consumers of 
innovation).78 
It was also indicated in the statistical study that a critical level of patent 
protection is needed before firms have an incentive to engage in licensing.  This 
is the reason, perhaps, as to why developing nations even after their ‘reforms,’ 
do not attract voluntary negotiations for licensing and have to resort to the 
compulsory nature of licensing. The study also showed, surprisingly, that with 
weak IPRs, firms may be compelled to undertake FDIs and not licensing, for 
obvious reasons.79  But as soon as the IPRs become strong, licensing is chosen 
over FDIs.80 
Intuitively, it is not difficult to understand why licensing thrives in strong 
IP regimes.81  If IP rights are not strong, prospective licensees will have 
sufficient incentives to imitate and use the product without paying any license.  
This theoretical thread binds all empirical studies too. 
This sub-section explains that voluntary licensing is prominent and 
effective in strong IPR regimes and compulsory licensing in weak IPR regimes. 
 
77. Copyrights and trademarks rights were found to exercise comparatively weak influences. 
This may be due to a number of factors, which don’t merit our attention here, except that there needs 
to be due appreciation of diverse nature of these intellectual properties and therefore one must 
understand that they deserve to be treated differently. See Landes & Posner, supra note 8. 
78. Ginarte & Park, supra note 73. 
79. Ignatius Horstmann & James R. Markusen, Licensing Versus Direct Investment: A Model 
of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise, 20 Can. J. Econ. 464, 471–74 (1987). See also Yang 
& Maskus (2001), supra note 66. 
80. Id. 
81. See Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1984) 
(for elaborate theoretical discussion). 
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D.  Connecting the Dots 
The three strands of discussion above can be connected analytically.  We 
attempt to do this here.  As discussed, whether liability or property rule be 
applied, is the outcome of the level at which transaction costs exist.  Property 
rules are achieved in low transaction costs, while liability rules are used when 
transaction costs are high.  Furthermore, voluntary licenses’ negotiations arrive 
at successful conclusions when transaction costs are low and compulsory 
licenses are invoked when transaction costs are high.  Therefore, when 
transaction costs are low, IPR regimes are property rule based, and are therefore 
strong.  On the other hand, liability regimes develop in IPR regimes, which are 
weak in nature.  Hence, it makes sense to install the framework of compulsory 
licensing in jurisdictions that are characterized by weak IPR regimes.  This is 
the pivotal result that we arrive at for the purpose of our analysis.  Analytically: 
SINCE, 
Property rules ≈ low transaction costs 
Liability rules ≈ high transaction costs 
AND 
Low transaction costs ≈ negotiation ≈ voluntary licensing 
High transaction costs ≈ no negotiation ≈ compulsory licensing 
THEREFORE, 
Property rules ≈ voluntary licensing 
Liability rules ≈ compulsory licensing 
IV.  IPR REGIMES OF CANADA AND INDIA 
The choice of comparative analysis of Canada with India stems from a 
shared priority that the countries have in their policies of access to medicines 
and their relative locations with respect to access to medicines and public health 
concerns.  Both countries have had their own tryst with implementing 
flexibilities in TRIPS (Canada employing the para. 6 decision of Doha 
Declaration and India invoking the domestic regulation clause for compulsory 
licensing), while located in different income group countries. 
In 2005 India shifted to implement the new Patent Act, with strong clauses 
in favour of inventors (for example, product patents replacing earlier process 
patents), and also implemented TRIPS with its flexibilities.  India has 
positioned itself as one of the global leaders in manufacturing of generic 
medicines.  India today, has assumed a pivotal responsibility of being regarded 
as what Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) calls, Pharmacy of the Developing 
World.82  85% of the HIV/AIDS patients that MSF treats in over thirty countries 
 
82. Leena Menghaney, Patent Dispute: Delhi High Court Gives a Boost to Access to Affordable 
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depend on generics from India.  MSF buys more than twenty-five per cent of 
the drugs for malaria, TB, and antibiotics from India.  Moreover, approximately 
fifty per cent of essential medicines that UNICEF distributes in developing 
countries come from India, “while 75-80% of medicines distributed by 
International Dispensary Association are made in India.”83  India has become 
the dispensary for the poor of the world.  Since the 1970s, India has become a 
drug producer for the developing world, revolutionizing the treatment of 
diseases like AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria with low-cost generics.  “It now 
makes one-fifth of the world’s generics.”84  Indeed, it is because of competition 
from Indian generics that the cost of HIV/AIDS treatment has come down from 
$10,000-$15,000 to $150 per patient per year, since the 1990s.85 This is a result 
of tremendous growth of pharmaceutical industry in India since 1960s, 
encouraged by government policies, the enterprising nature of post-
independence born Indians,86 and the Patent Act 1970.  This Act changed in 
2005, and TRIPS flexibilities were introduced.  The reason this merits our 
attention is because such policy changes have had, and will have, far reaching 
consequences in India’s pharmaceutical industry, which is the world’s third 
largest by volume87 and is poised to grow even further.  In addition, it will also 
have a bearing on India’s access to medicine situation.  India also has the largest 
population of people who are living without any adequate access to basic 
medicine.  65% of the Indian population lives below the access to medicine 
line.88  The government expenditure on health is only 17.9% while private 
expenditure is 82.1% reports the National Health Accounts of India and this 
happens when drugs accounts for about 70% of the total expenditure on health. 
Lack of purchasing power is one of the main reasons behind poor access to 
 
Medicines, 7 INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS 97, 100 n.2 (2010). 
83. Priyanka Golikeri, EU Firm on Strong IP Provisions in Free Trade, DAILY NEWS AND 
ANALYSIS, 8 June 2010. 
84. Erika Kinetz, Europe Trade Deal Could Hit Indian Generic Drugs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
April 26, 2010. 
85. Latha Jishnu, Vicious Sting in the Tail of FTAs, BUSINESS STANDARD (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/latha-jishnu-vicious-sting-in-the-tail-of-ftas-10906
2400080_1.html.  
86. See, e.g., AMLANJYOTI GOSWAMI, NAMITA DALMIA, & MEGHA PRADHAN, 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA (2008) (discusses in detail a primary survey conducted on Indian 
entrepreneurial aspects); R. Gopalakrishnan, “Prosperity Beyond Our Cities by Spreading Enterprise,” 
AD Shroff Memorial Lecture, October 17, 2007; see also TARUN KHANNA, BILLIONS OF 
ENTREPRENEURS: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE RESHAPING THEIR FUTURE AND YOURS (2007); 
PAVAN VERMA, BEING INDIAN (2005).  
87. M.V. Ramsurya, Pharma, Engineering to Topple IT as Big Paymaster, ECONOMIC TIMES, 
June 8, 2010. 
88. Andrew Creese, Nadine Gasman & Mamadou Mariko, The World Medicines Situation 
(2004), http://www.ops.org.bo/textocompleto/ime23901.pdf.  
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essential medicines in India. 
During almost the same time that India moved towards new patent laws–
Canada made noticeable efforts too.  It is the only country in the world to 
employ the August 30 decision to export essential medicines to countries that 
do not have capacities to manufacture them.  Canada has been able to do it 
successfully (although we will later see, it has its own implementation fallacies) 
and stands out in patiently carrying out the procedures in a multilateral level.  
Indian and Canadian experiences are very few of those that encapsulate 
implementation of TRIPS’ flexibilities for compulsory licensing89 and a 
comparative analysis will throw light on what these countries have to learn from 
each other and indeed, what other nations may need to follow from there. 
That said, the authors recognize the relatively differential economic and 
social locations of the two countries, and strongly note that our analysis is 
insulated from these natural concerns.  Even though the economies of the two 
countries are markedly different from each other, the issue of access to 
medicines, which this article primarily concerns with, is viewed from supply 
side economy.  Our analytical framework dissects institutions at the level of 
manufacturing and patenting.  As long as the countries have manufacturing 
abilities, different economic growth rates and relevant indicators do not call for 
the need of employing GDP deflator or purchasing power parity parameters.  
These instruments would be crucial if we are to study the market demand 
institutions.  The existence of competitive manufacturing ability, coupled with 
similar-spirited legal framework that governs supply side makes the 
comparative case immune to divergent economies and societies.  Hence, even 
though Canada and India are dissimilar in multiple respects, one of the few 
converging legal frameworks exists in the case of pharmaceutical industry–
which is something we intend to explore. 
A.  Access to Medicine Regime in Canada 
Canada introduced the Patent Act in 1923, and developed aggressive policy 
on compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical products.90  The only problem was 
the requirement to manufacture key ingredients in Canada.  Since the Canadian 
market was strong, producers did not have incentives to produce generic drugs 
making use of the compulsory licensing using expensive labour and the 
 
89. See Yugank Goyal, Economic and Procedural Constraints of Compulsory Licenses for 
Medicines, in COMPULSORY LICENSING─PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD (Reto 
Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., (forthcoming 2014) (For detailed analysis of compulsory licenses 
granted since Doha); see also Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1 (2012). 
90. See Paris Convention, supra note 25 at art. 5A (perhaps the only restriction was the 
prescribed minimum period of time before a compulsory license could be applied for). 
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technology of Canada.91  This became a crisis92, and in 1969, Canadian 
Parliament amended the Act to allow for import of active ingredient and 
medicines.  This reform had drastic results.  In the two decades following the 
1969 Amendment, 1030 applications were filed for compulsory licenses and 
613 licenses were granted as against forty-nine applications received (of which 
twenty-two patents granted) since 1923 until 1969.93 
In late the 1980s, pressurized from diplomatic corners and North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Canada was, for lack of a better term, forced to amend 
its compulsory licensing policies.94  In 1993, Canada abolished the compulsory 
license regime.  Canada however, designed new ways of promoting generics, 
using different ‘term of protection,’ ‘early working patents,’ and ‘stockpiling 
options.’  These created a lot of stir amongst U.S. and E.U. pharmaceutical 
lobbies and they dragged Canada to World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute 
resolution.  It appears that Canada was so dissuaded by external pressures trying 
to control its Patent Act that as soon as the 30 August 2003 WTO decision on 
the eve of Cancun Ministerial Conference (after Doha Development Round) 
was declared, in less than a month, Canada announced its intention to 
implement the same.  Canada was the first country to employ compulsory 
licensing using Decision of 30 August for importing an HIV drug to Rwanda. 
B.  Pharmaceutical Patents in India 
In India, pharmaceutical patents were first introduced by the British, during 
colonial rule, when they passed first patent law in 1856, just before formal 
beginning of British Raj.95  By 1970, India had realized that it has been hit by 
the influence of foreign firms (which controlled 70% of the Indian market)96, 
 
91. See Donald McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and Growth in 
Canadian Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN KNOWLEDGE BASED 
ECONOMY 65 (Robert Anderson & Nancy Gallini eds., 1998). 
92. The drug prices in Canada reached amongst the highest in the world, and Canadian 
provinces began to nationalize their medical services and pay for pharmaceuticals to cushion people’s 
burden.  See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OTTAWA RESTRICTIVE TRADES AND PRACTICES COMMISSION, 
REPORT CONCERNING THE MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF DRUGS (1963); see also 
Canada (1966), House of Commons, Special Committee on Drug Costs and Prices: Report of the 
Standing Committee on Drugs Costs and Prices, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer. 
93. See HARRY C. EASTMAN, THE REPORT OF COMMISSION OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1985). 
94. For political details about the amendment, see Joel Lexchin, Globalisation, Trade Deals 
and Drugs: Heads, the Industry Wins; Tails, Canada Loses, 2 CAN. CENTRE POL’Y ALTERNATIVES 
(2001).  
95. See P. NARAYANAN, PATENT LAW 5–6 (4th ed. 2006). 
96. P.K. Ramachandran and B.V. Rangarao, The Pharmaceutical Industry in India, 7 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. M-27 (1972). 
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and high drug prices.97  India therefore, passed a law on patents that prohibited 
product patent on medicines.  The Indian Patents Act of 1970 acted as the main 
thrust to India’s pharmaceutical industry.98  This led to a steep fall in the number 
of patents granted.99  Although the law permitted process patents on 
medicines100, it was rarely sought and had limited scope.101  This therefore, gave 
rise to a number of local pharmaceutical firms increasing their share of the 
market.102  Indian pharmaceutical firms became larger and more sophisticated.  
They employed reverse engineering methods to develop new processes for the 
drugs.  Over the next three decades, the Indian pharmaceutical industry became 
extremely competitive and diverse103 and by the 1990s, India started producing 
the most inexpensive medicines in the world.104 
In 1995, WTO introduced TRIPS.  TRIPS set up minimum standards of IP 
regulation105 specifying enforcement mechanisms, dispute resolution features, 
and remedies. India opposed TRIPS initially,106 but finally acceded to the 
Agreement, since staying out of WTO framework was a difficult choice.  
However, India bought time until 2005 to comply with TRIPS.  By this time, 
 
97. S. REP. NO. 87-448, at 43–44 (1961) (Which showed India with the highest prices of the 
seventeen countries surveyed, which included the United States); see Daniel D. Adams and William 
E. Nelson, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1082 (1963) (For report and other 
aspects of the sub-committee). 
98. Jean Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless 
Exploitation of Poor and Suffering 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6366, 
1998). 
99. Id.at 4. 
100. See The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, § 53(1) Acts of Parliament (2013) available at 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_Act_1970_28012013_book.pdf. For example, such patents only 
lasted for the shorter of five years from the date of grant or seven years from the date the patent was 
filed. 
101. H. Ashok Chandra Prasad & Shripad Bhat, Strengthening India’s Patent System: 
Implications for Pharmaceutical Sector, 28 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1037, 1057 (1993). 
102. This was accompanied by other regulatory and policy measures that the government took 
to encourage building local markets against foreign firms. See id. 
103. See SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: PATENT 
PROTECTION, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005) (For an overview of how pharmaceutical 
industry developed after patent law was enacted); Aradhna Aggarwal, Strategic Approach to 
Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries: The Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry, RIS, Discussion Paper No. 80 (2004) http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/
pdf/Dp80_pap.pdf. 
104. See CHAUDHURI, supra note 103, at 46–58. 
105. TRIPS contains requirements that nations’ laws must meet for copyright rights, including 
the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations; geographical 
indications, including appellations of origin; industrial designs; integrated circuit layout-
designs; patents; monopolies for the developers of new plant varieties; trademarks; trade dress; and 
undisclosed or confidential information. See id. See also Aggarwal, supra note 103. 
106. George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: 
The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283. 
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Doha Development Agenda had been carved out as well.  In 2005, India 
adopted TRIPS, and thereby institutionalized product patent regime in the 
pharmaceutical sector, supplanting the earlier process patent approach in 
pharmaceutical industry in the Patents Act 2005. 
The distinction between product and process patents is important to be 
emphasized.  India had only process patents since 1970.  In pharmaceutical 
industry, a process patent inherently makes it easier for generic manufacturers 
to adopt a different process and produce the same product by reverse 
engineering.  Since the marginal cost of making a drug is negligible, process 
patents enables generic manufacturers to manufacture a drug at a substantially 
cheap prices and consequently, market it at cheap price.  This way, from patent 
policy’s perspective, access to medicines was not a concern107–meaning Patent 
Act 1970 has produced a favoured system for access to medicine in India.108  
Therefore, India never needed compulsory license.  In other words, even if 
compulsory licensing was allowed, there were other less expensive means to 
produce generic drugs, so it would have been useless legislation. 
In 2005, India adopted TRIPS and consequently, product patents, thereby 
strengthening the IPR regime.  Since TRIPS in its pristine form was highly 
unfavourable to developing countries’ concerns regarding access, the 
flexibilities implanted in TRIPS by Doha Declaration, were also quickly 
adopted by India.  One of the flexibilities was compulsory licensing. 
V.  LOCATING CANADA AND INDIA IN THE MODEL 
Our hypothesis emerging out of the above discussion is that while Canada 
exhibits a strong IPR regime, India does not.  Canada is characterized by (a) 
product patents, (b) TRIPS-compliant laws, (c) R&D investments in 
 
107. See Biswajit Dhar & Niranjan Rao, Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into 
the Global Economy: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry in India, UNCTAD/UNDP 
Programme on Globalisation, Liberalisation and Sustainable Development, New Delhi U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc.22 (For the role of patents in the evolution of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry); see also, CHAUDHURI, supra note 103. 
108. Access to medicines has been a primary concern from the perspectives of affordability 
though, and largely so. India is overburdened by communicable and infectious diseases alongside an 
emerging epidemic of non-communicable diseases. But public health spending constitutes around 
0.9% of Gross Domestic Product. Government expenditure of health in India is 17.9% of the total 
health expenditure and remaining 82.1% is private in nature. See Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, 
National Health Profile 2005, CENTRAL BUREAU OF HEALTH INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL HEALTH 
PROFILE 77–79 (2005); see also MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, NATIONAL HEALTH 
ACCOUNTS OF  INDIA 2001—2002 (2005) (For the details of health financing in India). The World 
Health Organisation’s World Medicine Situation Report based 1999 data state that out of (the then) 
998 million people in India, only 17% has the access to medicine. For an overview, see K. M. 
Gopakumar, Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: Critical Review of Implementation of 
TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 L. & DEV. REV. 325 (2010). 
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pharmaceuticals, and (d) strict enforcement laws in place.  Upon carefully 
viewing the de facto patterns of patent rights intensity there, there is little doubt 
that Canada possesses very high strength in IPR regimes.  India on the other 
hand, has only recently amended its weak patent laws to make itself TRIPS-
compliant and create a framework for product patents.  Even after the de jure 
change, the situation in India remains bleak as far as strength of IP rights are 
concerned.  De facto piracy and IP infringement is very high in India, and even 
after amending the patent laws India has a long way to go before it can remotely 
be called as a country driven by strong IP rights. 
We showed that strong property regimes favour voluntary licensing, while 
weak regimes attract compulsory licensing.  This is because negotiations fail in 
case of weak property rights, and so government has to intervene and create a 
liability rule, in the form of compulsory licensing.  In strong property rights 
regimes, voluntary licensing can work and compulsory licensing is suitable for 
weak property rights regime only.  This means, Canada is suited for a strong 
property rights framework and India for a liability approach.  In other words, 
compulsory licensing creates a reverse spiral and pulls strong property rights 
towards transformation into weak property rights structure.  Strong IP laws are 
viewed to make information readily available, crystallizing boundaries and 
ensuring certainty of rules and institutions.  In such a situation, players are free 
to transact with each other, negotiate, renegotiate, and buy/sell licenses.  This 
system is supposed to work through a property rights framework.  Just when a 
liability rule approach is impregnated into the system, it develops cracks to 
weaken the existing property rights structure and strong IP framework. 
A.  Compulsory Licensing and its Impact on Strength of IP Regime 
Compulsory licensing is an old idea, first adopted by the 1883 Paris 
Convention, and fossilized into the pharmaceutical debate with respect to 
access to medicines.109  For a variety of reasons, it has been noted as a 
‘destructive’110 approach.  This is largely due to its potential to erode 
exclusivity of right and therefore disrupt an expected future profit from a 
patented medicine,111 which demands heavy investment in the first place.112  It 
 
109. See Chien, supra note 26. 
110. We borrow this phrase from Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind 
the Current Practice, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 139 (2009). 
111. Janna Greve, Healthcare in Developing Countries and the Role of Business: A Global 
Governance Framework to Enhance the Accountability of Pharmaceutical Companies, 8 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. OF BUS. IN SOC’Y 490 (2008). 
112. According to one estimate made three years ago, on an average, pharmaceutical industries 
spend upto $288 billion on R&D. See, e.g., Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing 
Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 
29, 30 (2008),  http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549-1676/5/1/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.
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is important to understand that most pharmaceutical research does not conclude 
in a patented medicine but instead renders many unsuccessful results.  Hence 
these companies must secure earnings that cover both R&D costs as well as 
cost of such futile research.113  Any decrease in such risky research will hurt 
medical innovation.  Compulsory licensing dilutes these incentives, and 
therefore can be counterproductive.114  Compulsory licensing acts as 
expropriation of IP and therefore sends a chilling effect to attractiveness of 
undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing world. 
Yet, empirically, the correlation between investments in R&D and patent 
protection is not very convincing.  Few studies have shown that perhaps the 
only industry, in which there exists a positive correlation between patent 
protection and investments in R&D, is that of pharmaceutical industry.115  Fisch 
has tried to establish that compulsory licensing reduces investments into 
research116 by comparing innovation activities in Canada and the United States 
in a period when the former was going through intense programme of 
compulsory licensing, and when Canada had much lower investment on 
research during this period.  Yet, as Eastman Commission reveals, if compared 
to other small, developed countries, compulsory licensing did not significantly 
erode the innovation in Canada.117  This was largely because Canada’s market 
was rather insignificant to the worldwide market for pharmaceuticals.118  In a 
classic study of 700 companies (various industries, including pharmaceutical), 
forty-two of which were subject to compulsory licensing, Scherer notes that 
these forty-two companies actually spent more on R&D.119  A very interesting 
study by Moser and Voena uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing 
after World War I, under the ‘Trading With the Enemy Act’ to examine the 
 
0050001-S.pdf. 
113. Greve, supra note 111. 
114. One of the good arguments that disfavour overuse of compulsory licenses is Kevin 
Outterson, Fair Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for Low-income 
Populations, 7 (2008), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/prizefund/files/outtersonaccess-to-
generics.pdf. 
115. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
116. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable 
Solution to an Unreasonable Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 313 (1994). 
117. Donald G. McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and Growth in the 
Canadian Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 65 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998). 
118. Id.  McFetridge reports that with the exception of Merck, 1994 Canadian R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of worldwide expenditures were less than 2%; e.g. 1.3% for Glaxo, 1.0% 
for Hoffman LaRoche, 0.7% for Pfizer, 1.2% for Sandoz, 1.4% for Ciba, 1.7% for Eli Lilly, and 6.1% 
for Merck. Id. at 84, n.24. 
119. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 
67–75 (New York University Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1977). 
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effect of compulsory licensing on domestic innovation.120  Analyzing around 
130,000 chemical inventions, Moser and Voena conclude compulsory licensing 
increased innovation by about 20%.121  There is, therefore, hardly any 
conclusive correlation that compulsory licensing hurts incentives to innovation. 
However, the fact that pharmaceutical companies will have weakened 
incentives to invest in drugs for those diseases that are prevalent in countries 
having strong compulsory licensing, cannot be ignored.  Indeed, firms often 
invest in life-style drugs rather than life saving drugs like for malaria, since the 
latter breaks into countries that have little affordability, and therefore higher 
instances of compulsory licensing.122  The impression of the strength of the IP 
regime in a country could therefore be measured by how frequent and readily 
available compulsory licenses are in that country.  The costs of compulsory 
licensing will be high in countries that have weak IPR, because these very 
countries will also have weak IPR regimes.  In a way, this gives rise to a vicious 
cycle. 
India presents a case of weak IP rights.  In India, there was no product patent 
for a long time since 1970.  This developed Indian pharmaceutical company 
into an imitating giant–thereby obviating any need of licensing structure.  
However, since the mid-1990s, when India decided to be a part of TRIPS, the 
strategy started shifting.  One of the most notable features was increasing thrust 
in R&D.123  India had no inclination to join TRIPS and had vociferously argued 
against joining the treaty,124 but given that negotiations were being done from 
the WTO, she finally acceded.  However, India was given until 2005 to comply 
with TRIPS.  This transition period had immense impact on the mindset of the 
pharmaceutical industry and that of policy makers in India.125  TRIPS propelled 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry to identify existing markets outside India 
and started looking to export, thereby intensifying their R&D efforts.  It has 
become one of the largest suppliers of pharmaceutical formulations in the world 
by volume126 and leading Indian pharmaceutical firms earn more of their 
 
120. Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 396 (2012). 
121. Id.at 396. 
122. Joseph Stiglitz, Trade Agreements and Health in Developing Countries, 373 LANCET 363, 
364 (2009). 
123. Mainak Mazumdar & Meenakshi Rajeev, Comparing Efficiency of Indian Pharmaceutical 
Firms, 57 INDIAN ECON. J. 60, 61 (2010). 
124. Foster, supra note 106. 
125. For example, India took other steps towards complying with TRIPS requirements in 2002, 
when it extended a twenty-year term to all patents, reversed the burden of proof in process infringement 
cases, and introduced for the first time a definition of “inventive step.” The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, 
§§ 2(ja), 53, 104(a) Acts of Parliament, 2013.  
126.  See, e.g., Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, & Panle Jia, Estimating the Effects 
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revenue through exports than through domestic market.127  Empowered, 
currently domestic companies control 80% of the domestic market when in 
1970 the share of Indian companies was only 20%.128  The exports of drugs and 
pharmaceuticals by the Indian pharmaceutical industry are around 5.3 billion 
dollars.129  Indian players regard globalization and IP as one of the strongest 
driving forces for this change. 
But even then, many of the biggest generic pharmaceutical product firms 
opened in India and they exported drugs to countries that have no patent 
protection, or those for which patents have expired.  Today, India’s 
pharmaceutical industry is not hinged on R&D, unlike many developed 
countries.  Although high barriers to entry in developed world market 
discouraged Indian pharmaceutical players to enter in that market, from the 
mid-1990s, Indian companies started making some serious efforts and slowly 
gained expertise in producing generic drugs in compliance with highly 
regulated pharmaceutical industry abroad.  Yet, the industry remained under 
the umbrella of weak patent rights.130  This only builds a case for compulsory 
licensing to be implemented in India. 
B.  Procedural Problems with Compulsory Licensing in Canada and India 
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) was the first domestic 
statute to implement WTO’s 30 August decision in the world.131  CAMR 
provides a system for pharmaceutical manufacturers to export generic drugs to 
least developed countries (LDCs) and developing nations through compulsory 
licensing.  However, shortcomings of compulsory licensing are visible once we 
dissect the chronology of first (and only) case of compulsory licensing–export 
of Apo TriAvir, an antiviral cocktail medication used for treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, by Apotex (a Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer) to 
Rwanda. 
 
of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1477, 1479 (2006). 
127. For example, more than 80 percent of the sales of the leading firm Ranbaxy occur outside 
of India. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., Key Markets Review, ANN. REP., 2007, at 12–14 
http://www.ranbaxy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ar2007.pdf. 
128. See Gopakumar, supra note 108, at 329; see also Reji K. Joseph, India’s Trade in Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals: Emerging Trends, Opportunities and Challenges, RIS, Discussion Paper 
No.159 (2009). 
129. See Joseph, supra note 128. 
130. Aaron Smith, India’s Elephant in the Room: Weak Patent Laws, CNN MONEY (May 4, 
2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/04/news/companies/india_biotech/; see also Economic and 
Political Weekly, A Confusing Patent Law for India, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1576, 1576 (2005). 
131. See Richard Elliot, Pledges and Pitfalls: Canada’s Access to Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceutical for Export, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 94 (2006). 
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The same year when Canada amended its patent laws to incorporate WTO’s 
August 30 decision to give birth to CAMR, Apotex committed to and began 
developing fixed dose combination of the HIV/AIDS antiviral drugs132, which 
were still under patent protection.133  The cost differential was substantial.134  
Apotex then had to amend the CAMR to include “combination” drugs in its 
scope.  This approval came from all sources in August 2006.  Then started the 
process of voluntary negotiations with patent holders (this is an essential 
criteria whereby all possibilities of voluntary negotiations have to be exhausted 
before applying for compulsory licensing) to buy the license.  Until September 
2007, these negotiations had not been concluded.135  Meanwhile in July 2007, 
the Rwandan government had notified WTO of its plan to import the drug from 
Canada.  This notification from Canada went to WTO in October 2007.  Apotex 
won the tender in Rwanda by May 2008, and the first package was shipped to 
Rwanda in September 2008.  It took more than one year for the shipment to 
reach the actual beneficiaries.  Overall, it took five years for one compulsory 
license structure to be effectively invoked and employed using the 30 August 
2003 WTO Decision—no wonder there have been none ever since.136 
In India, TRIPS/Doha style compulsory licenses have been incorporated in 
the amended Patents Act of 2005.137  Under Section 84, any person can make 
an application for a grant of compulsory license for a patent after three years 
from date of grant of the patent.138  Section 92A enables export of 
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity in pharmaceutical sector.  Note that Canada does not 
have a counterpart provision of Section 84, but only 92A. 
 
132. Holger Hestermeyer, Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of WTO 
Waiver on Patents and Medicines, 11 ASIL INSIGHT (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/11/issue/28/canadian-made-drugs-rwanda-first-application-wto-waiver-patents-and. 
133. The patents were held by Glaxo-SmithKline, and Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim. See id. 
134. Apo TrivAvir costed forty cents per pill, while patented medicine was priced at twenty 
dollars. See Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for 
Other Developing Countries, 5 CHINA INT’L L. REV. 177, 185 (2008). 
135. As we will see later, negotiations involving voluntary negotiations cannot remain 
unprejudiced if scope for compulsory licensing remains.  See id. 
136. See George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory 
Licensing Schemes under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1079 (2009) (for a 
brief chronology of events). 
137. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (dedicated Chapter XVI to the 
“Working of Patents, Compulsory Licenses and Revocation” and clarifies the ambit of compulsory 
licensing). 
138. Id. at §84 (The grounds that may be vouched to apply for the same include: “(a) that the 
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, 
or (b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or (c) 
that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.”). 
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India’s first ever–and only one as yet–compulsory license application was 
made by Natco Pharma to allow it to manufacture Roche’s patented drug 
Erlonitib (its trade name is Tarceva) for export to Nepal.139  This case was then 
digressed to another relevant though procedural matter, when Natco Pharma 
filed an interlocutory petition asserting that patentees be disallowed to 
participate in compulsory license hearings that takes place between the Patent 
Office and Natco.140  The petition was dismissed.  However, in March 2012, 
the Controller of Patents granted the first ever compulsory license in India to 
Natco.141 
Even the process of granting the first ever compulsory license was not free 
of its own complexity.142  This labyrinth of meandering structure of compulsory 
license has shown that it is not an easy medicine to administer.143  Yet, the costs 
of the procedure are worth the efforts in countries where IP regime is weak.  It 
is in these countries that inter-firm bargaining may not help nations achieve 
access to medicines, if left unto themselves.  Government needs to step in, 
invest in procedural costs and administrative delays, and ensure that people 
have access to life saving drugs. 
C.  Voluntary Licensing Works Alone but Cannot Co-Exist with Compulsory 
Licensing 
Voluntary licensing works in low market transaction cost, which in turn 
creates fertile breeding ground for strong IP laws and their sustenance.  Indeed, 
voluntary licensing has been working in most parts of the world where IP laws 
 
139. Following this, another application was also filed by Natco to obtain a license for Pfizer’s 
Sutent, also an anti-cancer drug. See Peter Ollier, India Holds Drugs Hearings, 182 MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP. 62 (2008). 
140. The issue in interlocutory petition was of audi alteram partem (hear the other side). This 
was purely a procedural issue from standpoint of this paper, hence we are not discussing it at all. For 
those interested, see Kumar, supra note 55. 
141. Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corporation, Compulsory Licence Application No 
1/2011. See J. J. Nedumpara & P. Misra, NATCO v. BAYER: Indian Patent Authority Grants Its First 
Ever Compulsory License on Pharmaceutical Products, 7 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 326 (2012); 
Shamnad Basheer, India’s first compulsory license: Patents v. public health, IP OSGOODE (2012), 
available at http://www.iposgoode.ca/2012/04/india%E2%80%99s-first-compulsory-license-patents-
vs-public-health/. 
142. For details into the entire application process and case, see 
http://spicyip.com/2012/03/breaking-news-indias-first-compulsory.html and http://spicyip.com/2011/
09/anatomy-of-natcos-compulsory-license.html and relevant hyperlinks therein. 
143. By way of information, recently in January this year, Natco Pharma has sought a voluntary 
license from Pfizer to manufacture and sell the latter’s drug Maraviroc (sold as Celsentri) for HIV 
positive patients. This drug is expensive and Natco’s claim is to manufacture the same drug at very 
cheap prices. It is expected that Pfizer is going to deny the license (it has six months to reply), owing 
to high cost in R&D that went behind the drug. Consequently, we may expect a legal battle again. See 
Khomba Singh, Natco Seeks Pfizer Nod for Drug Clone, ECON. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011. 
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are strong.  Oseltamivir, a drug marketed under the brand name Tamiflu, was 
developed to fight influenza and has been instrumental in treating millions of 
patients of bird flu, swine flu, and the like.144  This drug is sold by Roche, but 
it was developed by Gilead Sciences (which still holds the patent) and licensed 
to Roche.  In fact, Gilead has twelve drugs patented under its name, and eight 
of them have been licensed to other players at a fee decided mutually between 
the two parties.145  Roche sub-licensed the Tamiflu drug to Hetero Drugs in 
India to speed up availability.146  Last year, Santarus bought the license to make 
a diabetes drug marketed under the name of Cycloset tablet, from S2 
Therapeutics and VeroScience, at five million dollars.147  Structure for such 
voluntary licensing is very straightforward and works like any other license 
negotiation process, entirely voluntary.  In fact, it is fairly common to observe 
laboratories discovering the drug, and then licensing it to other manufacturers 
who can better market them.  Imagine a singer, who sings and licenses the songs 
to record company.  If property rights are strong, and (consequently) transaction 
costs are low, such bargains can emerge.  We must recognize that for companies 
there is no difference between drugs and audio CDs, no matter how much of 
difference it is for the consumers.  And any activity to tame inherent incentive 
game will only hurt the consumers more.  This is a strong statement, but the 
sooner we realize its poignant truth, the better we can structure the system. 
Our contention is that when compulsory licensing exists in the market, it 
erodes all possibilities of a voluntary licensing between manufacturer and 
generic manufacturer to exist.  If the licensee knows that after certain a period 
of time, she will get a compulsory license, at a fixed known rate of royalty, she 
will never accept a license higher than that rate.  On the other side of the table, 
the licensor will never reach any figure lower than that fixed rate.  Hence, the 
bargain will never reach, and if it reaches, it will always arrive at the rate fixed 
by government for license fee.  India and Canada are good examples.  Royalty 
of both countries is fixed (Canada used a more sophisticated method to 
calculate it, and India uses crude averages).  Hence, both in Apotex (Canada) 
and Natco’s cases (India), the parties could never have voluntarily contracted 
in the first place.148 
 
144. See Weekly Virological Update on 05 August 2010, WHO (2010), http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/swineflu/laboratory06_08_2010/en.  
145. Gilead, ANN. REP., 20 (2009), http://www.allejaarverslagen.nl/reports/508_2009.pdf. 
146. Roche Grants Tamiflu Sub-license to India’s Hetero Drugs to Make Flu Medicines for 
India and Developing Countries, MED. NEWS TODAY (Dec. 23, 2005, 5:00 PM PST) available at 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/35342.php. 
147. Update 1-Santarus Buys License to Make Diabetes Drug for $5 mln, REUTERS, Sep. 8, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSGE6870KN20100908. 
148. Canada and India are not alone.  Efavirenz (commercially sold as Storcrin) was the highest 
used antiretroviral drug in Brazil.  Brazil wanted to pursue a compulsory licensing approach to the 
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It would be a highly optimistic picture if we propose that voluntary 
licensing will always succeed in the absence of compulsory licensing.  This is 
because research in patent activities of a drug can be highly uncertain and it is 
hard to predict inventions and value them ex ante.149  Such uncertainty in the 
discovery process (of both the drug and its value) is bound to create divergence 
in both parties’ expectations and may stall the negotiation process.150  Such 
uncertainty also gives rise to strategic behavior during the contracting 
process.151  Therefore, voluntary licensing is not expected to always work. 
However, there is no reason to believe (infact more so on the contrary) that 
compulsory licensing is better suited. 
In addition, it is imperative to note that (a) courts may not effectively 
identify hold-up situations, justifying liability rules, (b) even if courts can 
identify the true scenarios, they are ill-suited to develop a liability rule 
framework.152  The would-be purchasers of property right would invariably 
prefer liability rules and use them as an opportunity for government rent-
seeking.  Parties see courts as administrative agencies overseeing liability rules 
as providing ‘cheap option’ which means a better deal than they could obtain 
in a marketplace arrangement.  As noted long ago, by F.M. Sherer, “All in all, 
the substantial amount of evidence now available suggests that compulsory 
patent licensing, judiciously confined to cases in which patent-based monopoly 
power has been abused . . . would have little or no adverse impact on the rate 
of technological progress.”153 
 
drug.  But this had prejudiced the negotiations on the side of Brazil.  The voluntary negotiations 
brought Merck (the manufacturer) to propose that it will ensure the technology transfer to 
pharmaceutical manufacturer Farmanguinhos, in time.  In addition, there will be two percent certain 
price reduction and Farmanguinhos can purchase the drug supply and perform packaging and labeling 
activities.  But this negotiation did not reach any end, owing to the final recourse of CL available in 
the hands of Brazilian government.  And that’s exactly what happened.  See Beatrice Sterner, 
Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS (Feb. 23, 2010) 
available at http://www.accesstopharmaceuticals.org/case-studies-in-global-health/efavirenz-brazil/. 
149. See Mark A. Lamey, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989; David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implication for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986). 
150. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (on dynamics of 
bargain breakdown). 
151. Ben Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS 
L. REV. 59, 72 (2008).  
152. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 
106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997). 
153. FREDERIC M. SHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 456–57 (2d ed., 1980). 
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VI.  BY WAY OF AN EPILOGUE 
Research on patents and intellectual property through the framework of 
property-liability has achieved only some attention from IP scholars, in varying 
dimensions.154  What we have tried to accomplish in this paper is to locate the 
strength of IP regimes in the property-liability framework as proposed to classic 
law and economics literature.  We derived from Cathedral Paper that societies 
must structure themselves on property rules when transaction costs are low and 
liability rule when transaction costs are high.  Voluntary licensing is an element 
of property rule while compulsory licensing falls under the liability rule 
approach.  Hence, low transaction cost dictate voluntary licensing and high 
transaction costs attract compulsory licensing.  Empirical results show that 
indeed strong IPR regimes favour voluntary licensing and weak regimes attract 
compulsory licensing.  This, when compared with previous results shows that 
property rules are the best mode of reliance when we have strong IPR regimes 
like Canada, and liability rules suit weak regimes like India. 
This paper in no way makes an argument towards completeness of the 
model, in explaining factors on which characteristics of compulsory licensing 
depends.  Indeed, a host of other factors determine a grant of compulsory 
license, including royalty fee, duration, scope, legal framework, international 
obligation, expected hit in FDI, relative bargaining position of the countries, 
market potential, public funds towards innovation, and the like.  This paper 
attempts to create a discourse on one of the fundamental grounds of compulsory 
licensing, which is, the strength of IPR regimes. 
In addition, like any analytical framework, our methodology does come 
with its inherent limitations.  The model crucially rests on property-liability 
framework elucidated in Cathedral Paper.  That model, in turn pivots on 
transaction cost economics.  A lot of work has been done since then in 
categorization, structural layering, and re-inventing the concepts of transaction 
costs.  The contextual application of transaction cost economics is therefore 
very important.  While our model does highlight the impact of such an analysis 
on compulsory IP regimes of the countries, it would also largely depend on the 
value of the transaction costs.  These values are difficult to collate, and hence 
most studies do not go deep into classifications of transaction costs, it does 
merit the question of what happens if the transaction costs vary greatly in a 
country from across regulations affecting the same industry.  In addition, 
 
154. A more general paper on such a framework is by Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, 
Coase and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); see also Jerome H. Reichman & 
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith E. Maskus & 
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).  
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although extremely comprehensive, existence of only two categories–low and 
high transaction costs–obscures subtle nuances in mid-level transaction costs.  
Our model would suggest that for those transaction costs, only procedural 
concerns in compulsory licensing will matter, but this cannot be conclusively 
ascertained. 
In addition, our approach seems to ignore intra-country differential 
structures of the pharmaceutical industry.  Firstly, note that compulsory 
licensing does not make any sense in a country, which has no manufacturing 
ability.  Secondly, even with those countries that have sufficient manufacturing 
capacity to warrant the use of liability approach, there may exist multiple 
industry structures and heterogeneous manufacturing patterns in form of big 
corporations and small and mid-sized enterprises and each one of these 
different patterns demand different institutional processes for their efficiency.  
However, we feel, the impact of such differential industry structure may not 
alter the conclusions significantly. 
In a society with strong IP rights, our critical approach to compulsory 
licensing would seem to have developed an oversight to public interest 
concerns.  This view is by no means myopic, since our purpose has not been to 
deliberately ignore this important issue.  Let us address this possible concern at 
two levels.  Firstly, our stand is clear as far as medical emergency, epidemic or 
drugs/diseases posing severe public health concerns and is sought to be dealt 
with immediately–and that is to invoke compulsory license right away.  Such 
scenarios are untouched and safely insulated from the implications arising out 
of our study.  The research question that has been posed in the paper is 
attempting to look at the institution of compulsory licensing in matters that are 
business-as-usual.  In other words, a general adoption of compulsory licensing 
is discouraged, but not exceptional.  Secondly, if the general discouragement 
of compulsory licensing appears to come at the cost of public interest, then such 
direct causal relationship needs to be rectified.  The apportioned contribution 
of present structure of compulsory licensing to achieve public interest goals is 
highly overstated, something glaringly apparent in the two cases in Canada and 
India.  Compulsory licensing has been too much of a victim of procedures and 
poor implementation.  Hence, agency does not bear the entire blame or merit.  
And these procedures are not easily rectifiable because they stem from the 
nature of institution itself and its framework.  Hence, compulsory licensing is 
itself incapable of achieving public interest goals in the first place, at least not 
to the levels expected.  So we may need to find alternative solutions.  Public 
interest is important but amorphous policies that have no theoretical grounding 
will do more harm than good. 
We intend to propose two policy solutions that have increased merit as 
compared to compulsory licensing for countries characterized by strong IP 
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regimes.  Elaborating these proposals is beyond the scope of the paper, but 
given their success in separate institutional frameworks begs us to briefly 
examine other alternatives.  These two policy outlines are therefore merely 
suggestive and require extensive study to test their efficacy.  None of these 
proposals can rectify informational problems vested in letting a third party 
decide upon the license fee/price.  However, they do not tamper with IP regimes 
and let their structure stay strong. 
a) One possible solution is competition law.  Compulsory licensing 
may not be justified because competition law can possibly benefit 
at a relatively lesser cost compared to compulsory licensing that 
imposes a huge cost on legal institutions.  Using competition law, 
similar to the model of Essential Facilities Doctrine (as is adopted 
in EU) can help us do away with the perils of compulsory licensing, 
yet achieve similar (intended) results.  It is the abuse of dominant 
position that patent accords to a company/product which must be 
attacked.155  This idea is to view high prices as abuse of dominant 
position, and let courts decide on appropriate prices, or let licenses 
be given on that account.  It is important to appreciate that even if 
licenses come from competition law, they denote a structural and 
functional divergence from compulsory licensing.  Incentives to 
innovate may not be diluted in the former case, because it has to be 
proved in the court of law/competition commission that an abuse 
had indeed happened.  With India constituting competition law in 
2005, and Canada’s Competition Act surfacing through 
Competition Commission and Competition Bureau respectively, it 
should be preferred in conjunction with strong IPR regimes. 
b) The second possible alternative–a more specific and effective 
strategy for India–would be to do what Canada has done.  The 
uniqueness lies in the federal government’s direct price control 
regulation.  This is done by an independent, quasi-judicial board, 
called Patented Medicine Price Review Board (PMPRB).156  
Whenever the Board feels that the price of a drug is excessive, it 
intervenes and sets the optimum price.  This is decided based on 
several criteria.  Particular attention is given to the median price for 
this drug in seven comparable countries: France, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  If the drug contains a 
 
155. For an impressive illustration, see John Temple Lang, The Application of the Essential 
Facility Doctrine to Intellectual Property Rights under European Competition Law, in ANTITRUST, 
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 56 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
156. Valérie Paris & Elizabeth Docteur, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 
in Canada, OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS 12-3 (2006) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/40/
37868186.pdf. 
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small improvement to already existing drugs, the board will first 
compare its price with one of the drugs in the same therapeutic 
class.  This price comparison system is, in fact, very similar to those 
used in other countries, such as in France, Spain, or Greece, when 
determining what brand-name drug (patented or not, in this case) 
can be listed on drug formularies.157  Another interesting thing is 
that according to the Patent Act (sections 79ss), patented drug 
prices cannot, in any case, exceed changes in the Consumer Price 
Index.  This has had a great effect on prices of the drugs. We 
discussed above, that post 1987, towards a restricted compulsory 
license regime, R&D investments have increased in Canada.  It 
must be mentioned that in the same time, patented drug prices 
reduced considerably and became, on an average, below the 
international median price.158  A chilling effect of such price review 
board (although there is lack of enough empirical data), cannot be 
denied, yet there is hardly any reason to believe that compulsory 
licensing stifles access-to-medicine-policies any less. 
 
 
157. See Melanie Bourassa Forcier & Jean-Frédéric Morin, Canadian Pharmaceutical Patent 
Policy: International Constrains and Domestic Priorities, in AN EMERGING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PARADIGM: PERSPECTIVES FROM CANADA 81, 87–89 (Ysolde Gendreau ed., 2009). 
158. See Paris & Docteur, supra note 156. 
